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State Rainy Day Funds and the State Budget Crisis of 2002-?
1. Introduction
On paper, states entered the recession that began in March 2001 well prepared. Forty-
seven states had established budget stabilization or "rainy day" funds. The funds contained over
5 percent of annual total state expenditures, which when added to general fund balances
amounted to over 12 percent of annual expenditures. By comparison, when the recession of
1990-91 began only 35 states had rainy day funds, their rainy day balances amounted to less than
1 percent of expenditures, and total balances amounted to less than 5 percent of expenditures.
During the recessions of 1980 and 1981, fewer than half of the states had rainy day funds.
Figures 1a and 1b depict the states' preparedness for the current fiscal contraction. Figure
1a plots the growing number of states with rainy day funds, from fewer than half in 1984 to
virtually all today. Figure 1b plots rainy day fund balances and total general fund balances as a
percent of annual expenditures. Both figures grew sharply during the latter half of the 1990s to
unprecedented levels, both in absolute terms and as a percent of state expenditures.
Despite these preparations, state budgets appear to be in serious trouble. The National
Governors Association (NGA) and the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO)
issued a press release last November saying that "states face the most dire fiscal situation since
World War II" (NGA, 2002a). The story, and that quote in particular, have been carried widely,
and motivate this conference on "State Fiscal Crises."
What accounts for the discrepancy between the historic levels of state fiscal preparedness
and the state budget crisis we face today? We can think of several explanations:1See, for example, "Bad Year for States' Budgets Expected to Lead to Worse One: Mandated
Medicaid, Prison Construction Costs Cited," Washington Post October 30, 1991, and "Recession Giving
States Nightmares: Taxes Are Raised, Payrolls Slashed," Washington Post May 13, 1982.
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(1) The claim that current state budget difficulties are unusual may be overstated.
(2) There may have been structural changes in state finances related to education,
Medicaid, homeland security, or tax receipts.
(3) The rainy day savings may represent fungible transfers from accounts that existed
before the establishment of the rainy day funds, and not "new" savings.
(4) State savings, even with the added rainy day fund balances, may simply be
insufficient to cover the recent revenue decline.
(5) The crisis may merely represent the reversal of an unusual tax revenue bubble of the
late 1990s.
In this paper we focus on the last three of these explanations, but let us begin by briefly
discussing the first two.
First, has this crisis been exaggerated relative to previous state budget crises? States are,
to varying degrees, required to balance their budgets. This means that every time there is a
national recession, states are supposed to raise tax rates or decrease spending. A quick scan of
headlines from 1991 or 1982 exposes the consequences of these balanced budget rules.
1 In both
previous national recessions, state budgets were squeezed by revenue shortfalls and increases in
necessary entitlement expenditures.
The national recession of 2001 was not unusually severe. National unemployment rates
have not risen above 6 percent, compared with rates over 7 percent for the early 1990s, over 8
percent for the mid-70s, and over 10 percent for 1982-83. Real gross domestic product fell
during three successive quarters in 2001, by 0.15 percent, 0.4 percent, and 0.07 percent. By
contrast, the early 1990s saw real GDP declines of 0.18, 0.82, and 0.49 percent, and the "double-
dip" recession of the early 1980s saw quarterly declines as high as 1.18, 1.66, and 2.04 percent.3
State budgets reflect the relative mildness of the recession. State general fund spending
was budgeted to grow by 0.4 percent in real terms during fiscal 2003. While this is a drastic
slowdown, real general fund spending shrank by 6.3 percent in 1983, by 1.1 percent in 1982, and
by 0.6 percent in 1980. Moreover, some states are relatively unaffected. Eighteen states
projected to end FY02 with year-end balances greater than 5 percent of expenditures (NGA,
2002b). Some states have continued to add to their rainy day funds or have refrained from
drawing them down -- Texas's fund contained nearly $1 billion in 2002, 3 percent of annual
expenditures.
Nevertheless, many states are slashing discretionary spending and enacting tax rate
increases. Even if the current state budget crisis is not worse than during previous recessions, it
remains an open question whether the states' unprecedented rainy day fund and general fund
surpluses have ameliorated those states' problems, and if not why not.
What about the structural changes? The NGA report cites the costs of Medicaid,
homeland security, the unfunded mandates regarding education ("No Child Left Behind"), and
the changing tax base of states from easily administered sales tax receipts to elusive internet and
service sector activities. While Medicaid expenses do increase during a recession, and they did
increase 13.2 percent during 2002, that is a slower rate of growth than during 1992. In 1991,
states faced increased costs of new prison construction and growing welfare rolls, neither of
which seem severe this time around. During the recessions of the early 1980s, states confronted
the "new federalism" policies of the Reagan administration, which shifted responsibility for
funding many programs from Washington DC to the states. The new issues facing states --4
homeland security, education mandates, and changing tax structures -- may not be so unusual
from this historical perspective.
That leaves the last three explanations for why the states' balances as of 2001 may have
been insufficient preparation for the current downturn: that they are merely re-labeled funds that
were typically saved in other accounts, that even the new savings are small relative to state
budget cycles, and that the crisis is a return to normalcy after a revenue bubble.
2. Are state rainy day funds "real" savings?
The growth of rainy day funds since the early 1980s does not necessarily mean that total
state government savings have increased. Deposits into rainy day funds may have otherwise
been saved in miscellaneous accounts in states' general funds. To cite but one example, from
1999 to 2002, as Texas built its rainy day fund from nearly nothing to almost 3 percent of
expenditures, the state's general fund balances dropped from 14 percent of expenditures down to
5 percent, more than offsetting the rainy day fund accumulation. If states merely relabel general
fund balances as rainy day funds, then they may be no more prepared for the current downturn
than for previous downturns.
Figure 1b provides some initial evidence to the contrary. While overall rainy day fund
balances increased in recent years, general fund balances have not decreased in an offsetting
fashion. Rather, general fund surpluses have grown along with rainy day balances, suggesting
that rainy day funds represent real savings.
More direct evidence is in Knight and Levinson (1999), which regresses total state
balances (rainy day plus general fund) on state characteristics, including the existence and size of5
states' rainy day balances and state fixed effects. The results suggest that states with rainy day
funds save more than states without them, that states that enact rainy day funds save more than
they did before the funds existed, and that rainy day savings are not offset by declines in general
fund balances. Rainy day fund balances appear to increase state savings dollar-for-dollar.
A contrasting set of findings is in Wagner (2002). That paper searches for "unit roots" in
the time series of state budget balances, and finds that state general fund balances decreased by
more than $0.50 for every dollar deposited into rainy day funds. While the paper concludes from
this that rainy day funds are only "the illusion of savings," one could equally well conclude that
rainy day funds increase state savings by almost $0.50 for every dollar deposited. An
intermediate case is presented in Sobel and Holcombe (1996). They measure the "fiscal stress"
of each state using the residuals from a long-run growth regression, and find that states that
mandate deposits to rainy day funds during flush years suffered less fiscal stress during the
1990-1991 recession.
In table 1 below we present a simple version of Knight and Levinson (1999), with
numbers updated through fiscal year 2002. The table contains two regressions covering 1984-
2002, and 48 states (omitting Alaska and Wyoming). In the first column, we regress total real
end-of-year balances on rainy day fund balances, state fixed effects, and time dummies.
(1)
The rainy day coefficient is 1.29. If the existence of rainy day funds were completely illusory, we
would expect its coefficient to be zero. If only 50 percent of rainy day fund contributions2Note that dropping the state dummies, or the year dummies, or both, makes little
difference to the rainy day coefficient, $1.
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increased overall savings, we would expect the coefficient to be 0.50. In column (1), however,
we can easily reject the hypothesis that the rainy day fund coefficient is less than 1.
2
We cannot, of course, interpret the rainy day fund coefficient as a causal effect. Those
states that enact and contribute to rainy day funds may simply have greater preferences to save,
and do so in both general and specific accounts. Moreover, rainy day balances are a component
of the dependent variable, total balances, so the regression violates classical assumptions about
the error term. To address this latter issue in column (2) we regress general fund balances
excluding rainy day funds on the same right-hand-side variables. The rainy day coefficient is
0.34, and is statistically significantly not negative. If rainy day funds were merely substituting
for other savings, we would expect the coefficient to -1.0. Even if only 50 percent of rainy day
funds constituted new savings, the coefficient would be -0.50. Instead, rainy day funds appear to
represent real savings.
If rainy day funds represent real savings, that discounts another explanation for why states
appear so well prepared for the recession and yet are facing unprecedented shortfalls. Even if
only 50 percent of the 2002 rainy day fund balances represent real savings, that would be twice as
much savings as states had on hand prior to the 1990-91 recession, and 10 times as much as
before the 1980 and 1981 recessions. An alternative explanation, then, is that even these larger
amounts are trivial relative to the amplitude of state budget swings.3See, for example, ACIR (1987), Poterba (1994) and Bohn and Inman (1996).
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3. Are state savings sufficient?
Virtually every U.S. state has a balanced budget requirement of some sort, ranging from
ineffective to quite restrictive. Some states merely require that their governors submit balanced
budgets. Others require the legislature to pass a balanced budget, but can run a deficit if an
unexpected shortfall arises. Stricter states require that the shortfall be corrected in the next fiscal
year, and the strictest of all do not allow states to carry over a deficit into the next fiscal year.
3
In principle these balanced budget rules mean that states will run pro-cyclical fiscal
policy: raising taxes and cutting spending in recessions, lowering taxes and increasing spending
in business cycle expansions. The only alternative would be to save enough in general fund
balances and rainy day funds during expansions to offset the revenue declines and expenditure
demands during contractions. While that is what rainy day funds are intended to do, they may be
insufficiently large relative to the swings in state budgets. Most states cap the size of rainy day
funds, typically at 5 percent of annual expenditures. Moreover, if some fraction of the funds
represent substitutes for savings in other accounts, even 5 percent represents an overstatement of
the overall savings.
To say whether the amount of state savings is sufficient requires an assessment of the size
of state fiscal cycles. This is conceptually easy. We would like to know by how much the state
deficit or surplus would change over the business cycle if states made no statutory changes in tax
rates or discretionary spending. In other words, leave tax rates unchanged, finance entitlement
programs as usual, and make no changes to the level of public good provision. States would then
run automatic counter-cyclical fiscal policies: deficits in recessions and surpluses in expansions.8
The gap between the largest deficit and largest surplus would give us a measure of the natural
amplitude of state budget cycles that needs to be covered by savings if states are prohibited from
running deficits.
In practice, this is difficult to assess. States do raise taxes and lower expenditures to
balance their budgets during downturns. Consequently, the actual gap between surpluses and
deficits understates the natural size of state fiscal cycles. Some authors have tried to measure the
amount of "fiscal stress" induced by these balanced budget requirements – i.e., the difference
between the natural fiscal cycle amplitudes and the actual amplitudes. Poterba (1994) uses the
difference between state budget forecasts for expenditures and revenues, and their realized
values. This too will understate the amount of fiscal stress because state budget officials can
forecast some of the shortfalls or surpluses. The Poterba measure only captures fiscal stress due
to surprises that occur between the time the budget is passed and when the books are closed at
the end of the fiscal year.
Sobel and Holcombe (1996) measure state fiscal stress by how much states’ expenditures
fall below their long-run growth. This understates fiscal stress for several reasons. First, to meet
budget requirements states boost tax rates. The more they do so, the less fiscal stress will appear
in state expenditure patterns, yet raising tax rates is one manifestation of fiscal stress. Second,
many entitlement expenditures, such as Medicaid, grow during recessions. Even if spending
remains steady, but entitlement spending increases while discretionary spending falls, that would
arguably be fiscally stressful.
In the end, we follow a procedure similar to Sobel and Holcombe, recognizing that it is a
conservative measure of the amplitudes of fiscal cycles. If we find that state rainy day funds are9
smaller than the amplitude of the state fiscal swings measured as departures from long-run
expenditure growth, that will provide convincing evidence that those savings are insufficient to
counter the effect of balanced budget requirements. On the other hand, if we find evidence that
savings are comparable in size to the fiscal swings, that could mean either that the rainy day
funds are sufficient or that we have underestimated the natural size of the fiscal swings.
To assess the degree to which rainy day funds are sufficient to counter state budget
swings, we first estimate the long-run trend of state expenditures, by regressing the log of
expenditures on a trend.
(2)
We then take the residuals from equation (2) and calculate the percentage deviation from the
predicted trend (exp( )-1). If rainy day funds are sufficient to offset fiscal cycles, they should
contain more funds than the typical deviation from long-run expenditure growth. To assess the
sufficiency of state savings, we compare the percent deviations from the trend, the transformed
residuals from equation (2), to rainy day balances and general fund balances, also expressed as
percentages of annual expenditures.
For example, figure 2 plots the residuals from equation (2), converted to percentage
deviations, for several states. California is having one of the most severe fiscal contractions.
The residuals are positive in the late 1980s, decline during and after the recession of the early
1990s, and grow steeply throughout the mid to late-1990s. From trough to peak, California's
expenditures grew from 16 percent below the fitted trend line in 1994 to 17 percent above the
trend in 2001. For comparison, we also plot the rainy day balance, which peaked at 13 percent of10
annual expenditures in 2000, and the total balance, which peaked at 27 percent in 2000. Through
the late 1990s, California's expenditures were growing rapidly relative to their long-run patterns.
Texas, by contrast, saw relative expenditures beginning to fall especially rapidly starting
in 1996. Most recently, while Texas has continued to add to rainy day balances, it has spent
down surpluses in other state funds more rapidly. Virginia's graph clearly shows the cyclical
pattern of state expenditures. Moreover, it looks as though the high rainy day and total balances
in 2000 may be contributing to the smaller amplitude of Virginia's current fiscal swings.
Figure 3 plots the average residual, across all 48 states in the sample, against the average
rainy day balance and average total balance. In figure 3 we can clearly see the counter-cyclical
state fiscal policy, with expenditures growing faster than the trend during the economic
expansions of the late-1980s and late-1990s, and shrinking during recessions. In 1996 the states
spent on average about 1 percent less than would be predicted by their long-run expenditure
growth. In 2000, they spent about 2 percent more. However, the average state had on hand
about 5 percent of annual expenditures in rainy day accounts, and 11 percent of expenditures in
total balances. This seems to us like a considerable amount of savings, at least enough to offset
substantially the typical counter-cyclical state fiscal policy for several years.
If these rainy day funds and other state savings represent real savings, and are sizeable
relative to state business cycles, there is another possible explanation for the scope of the current
state budget crisis: a revenue bubble in the late 1990s.4Corina Eckl, NCSL, cited in Von Sternberg (2002).
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4. Is the fiscal crisis the result of a revenue bubble?
The discrepancy between the apparent level of fiscal preparedness and the size of the
current crisis may be because the crisis really represents a falloff of revenues after an unusual
period of revenue growth in the late 1990s. Income tax revenues in particular grew quickly in the
late 1990s, and if states made long-term commitments based on that revenue growth, they may be
experiencing difficulty changing course now that the unusual revenues have dried up. According
to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), "states that rely most heavily on
income taxes have been hurt the worst."
4
Distinguishing between income taxes and sales taxes is consistent with simple economic
theory. If consumers behave according to life-cycle models, and recognize that their capital gains
incomes of the late 1990s were temporary, then they will spend only a small fraction of their
increased wealth. Sales tax revenues will not have increased as rapidly as income tax revenues.
This conjecture is supported by the data. Figure 4 plots real state tax revenues from various
sources for the past 15 years. Income tax revenues picked up quickly in the late 1990s, a pattern
not seen in property taxes, corporate taxes or sales taxes.
This distinction suggests an empirical strategy. We could compare states with and
without personal income taxes. In figure 2, for example, the two states without state personal
income taxes are Texas and Washington. In neither state did expenditures increase during the
late 1990s relative to their trend.
To compare all states, figure 5a plots the average expenditure residual for all states with
and without state personal income taxes. The first line (with circles) plots the average residual5Only Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington in our sample of 48 states
do not have personal income taxes. We also count New Hampshire and Tennessee as having no
personal income tax, as their taxes are so minimal. The results are no different if we exclude
those two states.
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for the 43 states in our sample with a personal income tax.
5 The second line (with triangles) plots
states without an income tax. Interestingly, during the late 1990s state expenditures were rising
relative to long-run-trends for states with personal income taxes, while they were falling for
states without personal income taxes.
Figure 5b plots similar data for state revenue residuals from a regression similar to (2),
but with state revenues as the dependent variable rather than expenditures. We see little
difference between states with and without personal income taxes. States with personal income
taxes seem to have experienced a later drop in revenues, and a steeper drop. States with personal
income taxes may have experienced a slightly larger trough-to-peak rise in revenues during the
late-1990s, but those differences are unlikely to be statistically meaningful.
If states' current fiscal problems can be seen as the consequences of a revenue bubble, we
would expect different patterns for expenditures and revenues for states with and without state
income taxes. The differences in figure 5a and 5b, especially in terms of state revenues, do not
appear large enough to be the primary source of states' current budget shortfalls.
5. Conclusion
We began by noting the discrepancy between the unprecedented level of public savings
held in states' general funds and rainy day balances at the start of fiscal year 2002, and the claim
that the current fiscal crisis is the worst since World War II. We suggested five potential13
explanations for the disparity: (1) hyperbole (2) structural changes in state finances, (3) illusory
rainy day savings, (4) insufficient state savings, and (5) a tax revenue bubble. Among these, we
find no standout candidate.
Several caveats deserve mention. First, it is difficult to quantify fiscal stress. We use the
difference between state expenditures and the long run growth path of state expenditures.
However, states face increased entitlement demands during recessions, and so expect increased
expenditures during recessions. Moreover, to balance their budgets, states raise taxes and cut
discretionary spending during recessions. A better measure of fiscal stress would be the degree
to which state expenditures fall short of what they would have been had states left tax rates and
discretionary expenditures constant. Our measure understates the amplitude of state fiscal cycles,
and thus overstates the degree to which state savings are sufficient to offset those cycles.
Second, we have estimated long-run growth of expenditures and revenues from 1984 to
2002. Both endpoints are years in which state finances were in poor shape due to a preceding
national recession. This can be seen in several of the state-specific graphs in figure 2. The
residual from the expenditure regression is below zero for both 1984 and 2002. It is also true in
aggregate, as can be seen in figure 3.
Nevertheless, it appears to us as though the recent increase in state savings is a real
phenomenon, that state savings have been at unprecedented levels in recent years, and that those
savings are substantial relative to swings in state budget cycles. Consequently, states entered the
recession of 2001 much better prepared than they would have been without those savings, and
much better prepared than for the recessions of the previous several decades.14
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Table 1. Rainy Day Funds Represent Real Savings
Dependent variable
Real total balances (including
RDFs) per capita
(1)
Real general fund balances
(excluding RDFs) per capita
(2)













Robust std. errors in parentheses.
Each regression includes state and year fixed effects.
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10Fig. 1b. RDF and General Fund Balances as a Percent of Expenditures
Year
 RDF Balances as % of Exp.  Total Balances as % of Exp.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 3. Average over all states
Year
 Avg. expenditure residual  Avg. RDF balance/expenditures
 Avg. RDF+Gen balance/expenditur





























































































































































































Fig. 5a. Average expenditure residual
Year
 With state PIT  Without state PIT









Fig. 5b. Average revenue residual
Year
 With state PIT  Without state PIT
1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
-.3
.3